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THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  IN  A rnANGING  WORLD 
Mr  Chainnan, 
May  I  begin by  saying what  a pleasure it is for me  to be  here today,  to have 
the opportunity to address  such  a distinguished gathering, and  in particular 
to speak under your  chairmanship. 
-t·  + 
+ 
So  far in  ~his Symposium  you  have  been  talking about  the longer-term prospects 
for European  business and  the broad trends which  affect its future - such 
questions as  the impact  of technology upon  society,  the role of free enterprise, 
and  the need  for economic  growth.  ~1y remarks  to you  are intended to stand 
at a point of transition to the consideration of the more  immediate  problems 
which  confront you  as managers.  And  indeed it is appropriate that you  should 
take the current  de~te about  the character and  principles of a new 
international order as  the focus  of this transition in your discussions. 
For it .is in the context of the debate about  a  new  international order that 
the long-term challenges which  face  the world  economy  - to say nothing of the 
world's political structures - are going  to be  made  concrete.  And  it is 
also in that context that we  are being brought up  against the hard edge  of 
practical decisions. 
It is important,  however,that  tn  all this we  should keep  clear before our 
minds  the wider  issues of a more  philosophical character that are at stake. 
Generalities lvithout particulars make  a windy  diet:  but particulars without 
a  context to give them  significance also make  an  unsatisfactory meal  - and 
one  in which· there might  be  a danger of swallowing too much. 
How  then can we  best understand the present juncture in world affairs and 
the challenges which  the future-,is  likely to pose?  -- ·  -- -.
0~ 
Here  I  would  suggest to you  what  1  believe is a  revealing analogy •. Take 
::~-~  the recent historical experience of our  own  advanced  industrial societies 
here in Europe.  What  can  we  learn from  that experience in seeking to 
understand the general tendency of relations between  the developing·.  countries 
and  the developed world,  and  also between  the societies which  make  up  the 
developed world? 
The  main  features of the recent history of Western  Europe  might  be  summed 
up  in two  propositions.  The  emergence  and  growth  of mass  democracy has  led 
to the increased social direction and  management  of economic  life.  And  the 
emergence  and  grmvth  of industry has  led to increased international economic 
interdependence and  integration.  These  great historical processes have 
transformed the ancient societies of Europe  over the past two  hundred years, 
and  they are now  reproducing themselves  on  a  global canvas  throughout  the 
developing world.  The  basis of the analogy  lies in the similarity between 
/these processes - 1  -
these processes  and  the emergence  of a  large number  of independent  countries 
in the Third World  and  of our  ever-increasing economic  interdependence \<Jith 
them. 
+  + 
+ 
The  parallels are striking - as  a witness the United Nations.  And  this 
new  universal suffrage of the nations has  brought with it an  increasingly 
insistent and  powerful  pressure for changes  in the economic  sphere,  just as it 
has at the  level of our  own  societies.  It is something  of a mirror image.  Just 
as it has  for long been  a  feature within our national societies, so  nmv 
there is increasingly at international level a widespread demand  for the 
redistribution of wealth  and  for the deliberate planning and  management  of 
economic  processes so  as  to secure a  greater share for the poor in the growth 
of prosperity. 
As  we  in the rich world  of the  North  face up  to these demands  from  the poor 
countries of the  Sout~h, what  lessons can we  apply from  our  own  historical 
experience? 
The  first lesson is, surely,  that it is both impossible  and  wrong  to 
resist the pressure of the less well off for a better share ·in the good 
things of this lite.  As  Churchill once  said:  "The  earth is a  generous 
mother  - there is sufficient for all.  Let  us  go  forward  together."  The  fact 
of the matter is tliat' quite apart from  any  considerations of morality there 
is the question of interdependence.  In the world  today all our  societies 
are increasingly interdependent:  the poor nations benefit from  the 
expansion  of the rich economies,  and  suffer when  they stagnate,  and  the rich 
nations need  the markets  of the poor.  There  can be  no  doubt  about  the extent 
to which  the stability and  capacity for peaceful progress, both of our own 
societies and  of world society as a whole,  depend  upon  the cooperation of the 
great masses  of people upon  whose  consent our  systems  are ultimately based. 
This  is the lesson of all the gteat social conflicts of recent European  history. 
And  although it may  as  yet be  difficult for us  to conceive  the specific 
forms  that a  similar conflict might  take at the level of the relations between 
the rich nations and  the poor,  we  can  certainly apply something  from  our  o\~ 
experience in the avoidance  or resolution of such antagonisms • 
. :·~.  ...  But  let us  not view  the matte.r-in-too  ... negative a spirit - as if it were  a 
question of finding  the least that we  can  grudgingly give  away  in the 
fear that if we  do  not,yet more  might  be  taken away  from  us.  In the experience 
of our  societies the direct result of·the political pressure for abetter 
deal has been  the expansion of the purchasing power  of the less well off. 
And  we  have  learned that this expansion of consumer  purchasing pmver  is an 
. enormously  constructive engine  of prosperity and  growth.  Further - this expan-
sion can  be  nourished  and  sustained by  the deliberate management  of demand 
and  by  a rational approach  to institutional reform and  structural change.  What 
is required here,  and  what  our  experience shows  to be possible of attainment, 
· is a wide  measure  of consensus  about where  we  are going  and  how  we  should 
get there,  and  a  climate of cooperation rather than conflict and 
confrontation. 
/In short -_,-
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In short, postwar developments  in the industrialised world and  especially 
in the Community  afford us  grounds  for reasoned hope.  We  will no 
doubt  never recapture the first fine careless rapture of the two  decades 
after the war  with the phenomene.l  growth  that took place, at least in our 
societies.  And  it is of course  true that we  have  since been brought hard 
up  against the dangers  of inflation and  the intractability of deep-rooted 
social problems  and  the  limit~ that· are set upon  the availability of 
scarce resources.  But  we  lmow  now  that, if we  are prepared to work together 
in observing the rules, economic  life need  not be  a  zero-sum game,  and  that -
at least up  to a point - the rule-book can  be  altered to suit the interests and 
desires of the participants.  Europe's  remarkable post-war successes in the 
management  of society - and  viewed  in the light of history our success  over 
the past three decades  has  been  remarkable  - are not the accidents of a unique 
time  and  place.  They  support  conclusions of universal and  enduring 
validity concerning the means  to economic  and  social progress. 
There  is no  reason why  these conclusions  - especially as we  have  formulated 
them  in the Community  - should not be  applied with equal  success  in the 
wider framework  of world society as  a whole. 
A further lesson is the importance  of thinking about  economic  and  social 
progress  in dynamic  rather than in static terms.  To  assume  that the sum  of 
man's  riches is limited to the current possessions of the better-off is the 
mistake made  by  most  of the advocates  and  many  of the opponents  of the 
redistribution of wealth,  both within our  own  societies and  in the context 
of relations between  the rich nations and  the poor. 
I  yield to no  one  in the conviction that the key  to a  new  distribution of 
wealth more  favourabYe  to the less well-off lies in growth  and  the creation 
of new  wealth,  rather than simply in the redistribution of 
existing wealth.  But  let there Le  no  doubt  that we  cannot go 
on  with the situation which  prevailed in the 1950s  and  1960s  - years when 
our prosperity and  growth  in the industrialised world saw  a widening 
rather than a narrrnving  of the gap  between  the rich nations and  the 
poor.  This is no  more  acceptable in world  terms  than we have found  it to be  in 
our societies. 
Let me  now  sum  up  the lessons which  our historical experience should  lead us  to 
apply to the relationship between the rich North  and  the poor South. 
,First:  we  should not resist the pressure for change,  but rather seek to ensure 
that it flows  into constructive channels.  Here  Europe's  experience in 
.  __ managing  the same  kind  of forces  of change  should  enable it to_p.l.a¥--a  crucial 
role. 
Second:  that if we  do  adopt  this approach we  may  be  surprised by  our 
·success and  by  the extent to which  we  can  transform the pressure for change 
into a powerful  force for prosperity and  growth. 
Third:  that we  have  less than we  think to fear and more  to hope  for from  the 
application in internatiap.al economic  relations of a more  systematic and 
politically sensitive management  policy. 
Fourth:  that such  a  policy can  only be  developed upon  a basis of consent 
and cooperation engaging the greatest possible range  of participants. 
Fifth:  that the object of our policy must  be  the promotion  of faster 
growth,  accompanied  by  the wider  and  more  equitable distribution of the 
wealth that flows  from  it. 
+  + 
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History affords us  lessons  of equal validity,  I  believe,  when  we 
pass  from  the  problem of North-South relations  to the problems  th;::~t 
arise in the relations  between  the  advanced industrial societies 
themselves. 
These  lessons  stem not  so much  from  the  pa~allels between the 
democratisation of our  own  societies  and  the present growth -of 
democracy in international relations,  as  from  the parallels between 
our experience of the  indust~ialisation and integration of our 
economies  and  the similar processes  which  are now  working  themselves 
out in the international  economy  of the industrialised world. 
The  industrial  economy is built upon  the gains  in productivity 
which  flow  from investment,  technology and  increasing specialization. 
The  forces  of sustained growth can,  however,  only be set free under 
political and social conditions  which  favour  the integration of 
markets  and factors  of production.  And  the struggle to realise such 
conditions  has  been a  consistent feature  of the history of Europe 
over the  two  centuries  since the beginning of the industrial 
revolution. 
In the historical  experience of  Europ~ this struggle has  gone  through 
three phases.  In the first phase, the  focus  of integration was  the 
nation state.  All  over Europe local  and purely regional markets  and 
factors  of production were  broken  open  and unified within the  fra~e­
work of separate national  economies.  These were presided over by 
national  governments with a  monopoly of regulatory powers  in the 
economic  sphere and of the right to create money.  For  a  time  these 
purely national autbgrities  succeeded very well in their task of 
ensuring the orderly and stable conditions which were necessary for 
the progress  o£ economic  integration and growth. 
But  the dynamism  of the industrial process  was  spilling over the 
frontiers  of the nation states  by  the end of the last century.  World 
markets were  developed and  the resources  of the most  remote parts  of 
the globe  began to be brought into play.- In this  second  phas~the 
focus  of integration expanded, f~om the nation state to the imperial 
state.  Rival  empires  emerged,  each bringing within a  single frame-
work  the  economies  of the most  diverse territories,  and  each 
reproducing  on  a  gigantic scale the unifying and centralizing 
characteristics of the nation state,  especially in the economic 
sphere. 
~-~;.:- · · ...... :- But· in its turn this  system·of~integratiori· through  emprre-a1scf - :·;;:~:- -,  .. 
::::-·::·.  proved inadequate,  not  only bec.ause  of the natural desire for 
·:.::.-,:  '·"·  independence,  but also because instability and. a  tendency to conflict 
L_:;;;_::~.  were inherent  in- the existence of· a  set of independent· centres  of 
power  each  jealously bent on guarding its  OWn  so1:'"?:!reignty. 
Since  the system of rival imperialisms met its political bankruptcy) 
the world  economy,  and in particular the  economy  of 
the European  Community_,  has  been organised around an alternative 
conception of international  economic  relations. 
Our  approach  si.nce  Bretton vloods  and the Paris  and  Rome  Treaties 
han  bocn  founded  upon  the lJ.br:r.alization of trade and  the 
dismantling of inter-state barriers in every field.  Markets  and 
factors  of production previously integrated vertically in separate 
national  or imperial systems  have  been integrated horizontally on a 
transnational and transcontinental basis.  This  has  gone  farthest 
within the  Community.  In the post-war years  the ghost of autarchy, --
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at least within Western Europe,  has  been more  or less  firmly laid, 
the division of labour between the industrial societies has  become 
increasingly sophisticated,  and  the volume  of international  trade haA 
grovm. to unparalleled dimensions.  These  achievements  have made 
possible a  vast increase in the productivity and standard of living 
of  the industrialised world. 
But"over the years it has  become  increasingly doubtful whether the 
successes  wrought in Europe  and across  the world by this  system can 
be  sustained without  the  agreement  of governments  to carry this 
cooperation very much  further  than they have in the past been willing 
to go.  Hence  our insistence  on  the philosophy of interdependence. 
Within the  Community  we  have  reached a  point at which  further 
economic  integration requires  something more posi ti  vr:  th.rLl  the 
mere  removal  of obstacles at the frontiers.  And  om:  experience 
of  the recession of the past  two  years  supports  the conclusion 
that the world  economy  has  reached a  critical stage of inter-
dependence at which we  need  to move  to  a  higher level of  joint 
management  of our international  economic  relationso 
X  X 
X 
If we  accept  this broad historical scheme,  what  lessons  are we  to 
draw  from it for our future policy? 
To  my  mind  the first conclusion we  must  draw concerns  the importance 
·of a  political structure adapted to the  requirements  of  economic 
progress.  It is true that industrial growth is a  dynamic  force 
flowing  from many  sources  quite remote  from  the arena of politics. 
But it can only realise the full potential when it operates  \.<Ji thin 
an orderly and above all a  relevant  framework  of disciplines  and 
government.  Su~h a  framework  has  been supplied successively,  first 
by  the nation state,  then by  the imperial  systems,  and  no~.;~  in our 
_ time it is to a  system of international disciplines,  restraint, 
-..  c~operation and _lillreement  _!:hat_~we  __ mu~t  lqok~  __ At  _  _g_g.ch._s..tage  it has 
had  a  crucially important part to playo 
Asecond conclusion concerns  the nature and functions  of that  frame-
work.  Although we  have made  immense  strides  towards  international 
agreement  and cooperation,  especially in the  Community,  we  have still 
not made much  progress  beyond  a  rather negative conception of the 
purposes  and limits  of ou·r  ~.vorking together.  Ninety per cent  of 
international agreement  today is designed  to deal with the 
consequences  of the division of the world  among  sovereign states. 
The  positive functions  of economic  management are still by  and large 
carried out where  they were  placed in the  19th century,  at the level 
of the nation state.  I  have  no  doubt  that if the industrial world 
and especially the  Community  ls to get  the full  advantages· of the 
policy of internat:tonal  cooperation upon which we  embarked after the 
wa~we must  be  prepcrcd to  go  further down  the path of integration. 
We.must  begin to think of Europe  as  a  single economy,  not as  a  set 
of distinct national  economies,  however closely linked.  And  indeed 
we  must also recognise  the intimacy of the relationship which exists ---
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between the European economy  and  the world  economy  as  a  whole. 
Our experience in the past also yields  a  third conclusion - that 
there is in nature an ultimate  economic  logic which cannot be  over-
ridden merely  by political decisions.  It is, for instance,  one  of 
the features  of that economic  logic  that in the long  run investment 
and  growth will not  occur where  there is no  freedom  to make  profits 
and  to enjoy  them:)  or where  the prospect of political stability is 
lacking. 
And,  to  take another economic  truism that seems  nowadays  to receive 
insufficient recognition,  there is a  natural  interdependence between 
buyer and seller, wl2ether in the labour market or in the market  for 
commodities:  the  buyer must  go without if he  cannot  afford to pay 
the seller's price - but if the seller cannot get his price he  too 
must  go without.  So  both seller and  buyer are worse  off if the price 
is set arbitrarily or too high  - Hhich is all too  often the effect of 
a  surfeit of political interference or insufficient respect  for  the 
realities and  indeed the vagaries  of the market.  These  old lessons 
are now  having to be painfully learned again,  and it is fundamental 
to  the future health of the world economy  that the right conclusions 
should now  be  dravme 
X  X 
Mr.,  Chairman:  the challenges  which  face  the  Community  and  the world 
are rooted in our economic  si  tuat5.on.,  But  they are not  just economic 
challenges.  Our prcbi:cm is not  one  of economics:  it is one  of 
politics.  And  as  such it is ultimately a  challenge of the same  type 
whether it is being posed in the  economic  relations  between the 
developing countries  cf the  0 Th5.rd Horld"  and  the industrialised 
countries  of the "Firs": World'
1 ~  or l·:rhe~her it concerns  the relation-
shin between the industrialir-ed nations  themselvesr. 
4 
Our  relationship with the developing countries is being cast in a 
.new  political frameHork  by  ..  the, dem;:tnds  of the Third World for what 
they call a  rrNew  Internation::1J.  Fr:::onom:tc  Order",  and  by our attempts 
to  find a  new  consensus  ,,7hich  comes  to grips w:Lth  those  demands  and 
. _which  recognises  the  fundamental  interdependence of our economies., 
...  -A new  balance of ri.r;hts  and re8ponsibilities is  being called for,  and 
-····· · :  _our  task is to  see  tha.t it is. a  proper balance in which  the rights  are 
··  ·:::·:..::  ... not· all on  one  sice end _the  responsi.bili  ties all on  the --othero.  An 
~--·.--improved framework  is B.lso  reqttb:-ed  for our mutual  and even more 
c-:..·c,  __  ..• .radically interdepenclent relations .'tvithin the industrialised "First 
:~:::.~-~2· ..  ,.:::~~  World''.  On all sides  the -d:Lst:i.ncti.on  betw'een internatj'Donal  and· 
;r;.:.:·  .-::r.:·~- ..  ~.national politics is  dis-solving:~  and economic  issues have  now  become 
the very stuff of internationai politics., 
To  overcome  the  tensions  inherent in this  situation, we  1vill need to 
develop  new  national and international mechanisms  for weighing  the 
implications  of  domestic political and  economic  decisions  for  the 
international economy  as  a  whole8  We  will have  to develop  a  frame-
work  for the  joint mA-nagement  of our distinct but  convergent policies  .. 
We  will 'have to build uo  ne1v  reserves  oi:  mutual  trust and confidencefj 
~.  .And  as  an essential feature of all this,  we will need to ensure that 
,  public opinion is much better informed on what are the new  realities 
of today. 
No  one  should imagine that it is consideration of our  economic well-
/being - 7  -
being alone that should prompt  our efforts!..  For  the 
fact is that in the present age,  accustomed  as  we  are to an ever-
expanding horizon of material expectations,  the link betvJeen 
economic well-being and  a  tranquil  and  self~confident political 
order is more  intimate than perhaps  ever  be~ore in  history~ 
During  the period of economic  crisis before  the  Second Horld War, it 
looked to many  as if the mainspr:Lng  of our free  and  d-e.m0:::ratic  way 
of life in the Vlest  had been brol-::.en:  as  the barriers Hent:  up  on 
every side it seemed that the \vo-::·1d  'i.vas  in the grip of  er:onomic 
forces  - and  therefore,  eventually,  of political forces  - beyond 
its control.  Out of it all came  the war.  But  :i.n  the end  the 
democracies  found  the political will,  the imagination and  the strength 
to meet  the challenges  which  faced  them.  And  the  consequence has  been 
that over  the past thirty years  here in Europe  and  thrm1.ehout  the 
Western world  the open·economy,  the open society,  has  once more 
repeatedly given proof of its superior humanity,  its superior dynamism 
and creative power. 
Though  the challenge of change requires us  to be infinitely 
adaptable,  nimble in though  and flexible in policy~  these remain 
the values which must  continue to guide us. 